Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric

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TISIAS AND CORAX AND THE INVENTION OF RHETORIC

A LASTING tradition among the ancients marked Sicily as the birthplace and Tisias and Corax as inventors of the art of rhetoric: and in this tradition, legendary though it became, there is a stricter truth than in most of the stories related about the foundation of invented arts. We, with more elaborate historical views, shall still say of rhetoric that it was created at a certain epoch; and can still point to the Sicilians Tisias and Corax as its authors. Oratory, to be sure, has existed almost as long as speech. Its beginnings are prehistoric, and must in any case be imperceptible; and if by rhetorician we meant no more than one who uses speech with more than common effect, we might set the origin of rhetoric as far back as we chose, and could hardly bring it lower than the beginning of recorded literature. Indeed we are told that under the Antonine Emperors the eminent scholar Telephus of Pergamum wrote a book on *Rhetoric in Homer*, in which he illustrated from the Poet the whole contemporary system of the art down to the thirteen constitutions of Minucian;[1] and in the same spirit the Venerable Bede, resenting the claim of the Greeks to have invented tropes and figures of speech, wrote a short work to show that they could all be found in Holy Scripture.[2] But such inquiries, even when conducted less foolishly than by Telephus and less incompetently than by Bede, are irrelevant to the proper history of rhetoric. Let the practice of oratory have begun when it may, the first attempts known to us in Classical Antiquity to formulate a series of principles for the art of speech were made in the fifth century before Christ. These earliest systems were naturally very imperfect: they could not immediately be either comprehensive or well organized. But they were something that had not existed at all before: methodical principles for speaking. At the moment when these were first set out the art of rhetoric began.

The only traditional rival to Tisias and Corax as first author of the art is Empedocles, whom Aristotle in his early dialogue *Sophista* is said to have called the inventor of rhetoric as Zeno was of dialectic.[3] But the claims of Empedocles are very doubtful. He can hardly have been much older than Corax: and there is certainly no reputable evidence that Corax learnt anything from him. There may be some truth in the vaguer version given by Sextus Empiricus (*adv. Dogm.* i. 6), with which Quintilian (iii. 1. 8) agrees: Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γάρ φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι—*primus post eos, quos poetae tradiderunt, mouisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur*. Empedocles, as the sage, worthy, healer and prophet of Acragas, held a position in many ways anticipating that of the sophists, among whom Gorgias is reputed to have been his pupil. At all events he was not ignorant of the arts of publicity; and public discourse must have been familiar to him. It is therefore natural that he should afterwards have had the reputation of having been a rhetorician, and it would not be surprising if Aristotle declared him to have made tentative approaches to the subject. But nowhere is it stated that he wrote upon or taught rhetoric; nor do any authors ever refer to his views on the art. Even Quintilian classes him next the legendary orators of the heroic age, and reserves for Tisias and Corax the position of *artium scriptores antiquissimi* which really entitles any one to be called the founder of rhetoric. What is more, Aristotle himself in another work, apparently the *Synagoga*, set Tisias and Corax in that place as the first rhetorical theorists.[4] From them therefore we may begin.

[1] *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (ed. Rabe), p. 189 = *Rhet. Graec.* vii. 5 (Walz): see also Wendel in R.E.

[2] *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Halm), p. 607.

[3] Diog. Laert. viii. 57.

[4] Fr. 137 Rose *apud* Cic. *Brut.* 46.

Corax, as Tisias' master, would appear to be properly the inventor: but whether he wrote a book himself, or bore a part in one written by Tisias, or allowed Tisias to write down his own verbal teaching, we cannot certainly know. No faith, obviously, can be placed in such expressions of the minor rhetoricians as συνέθηκε τέχνην or Κόραξ ὁ τεχνόγραφος:[1] and most of them in any case are not explicit. Aristotle was apparently able to distinguish the two authors' contributions to the art when he wrote in *Soph. El.* 183[b] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασι, Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον. In *Rhet.* 1402[a] also he speaks of ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη as made up entirely of argument from probability. But in neither case need he have known Corax otherwise than through Tisias; and Plato, when in the *Phaedrus* (272 D) he deals with this same method of argument from probability, throughout takes Tisias as its exponent, though implying that he was not altogether responsible for it. 'A very mysterious art it seems to be,' says Socrates, 'this invention of Tisias or what's his name, whoever it was.' Considering Plato's language together with the facts that nowhere is there an express mention of two separate books, that Aristotle in the *Synagoga* couples the two men as authors of one, and that Cicero in *de Inventione* ii. 6, on information derived in the first instance from an Hellenistic source, names Tisias alone as the inventor of the art and as the first author represented in Aristotle's *Synagoga* itself, we must allow it to be probable that Corax's work did not survive outside Tisias' book: and at that rate it is much more conformable to our evidence to suppose that the book contained Corax's verbal teaching than that it was the product of joint authorship.[2]

There are two traditions of the origin of Corax's rhetoric. One is that to be collected from the Minor Greek Rhetoricians in Walz's collection or Rabe's *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, who agree in the following account. After the death of Hiero, when a republic was established in Syracuse, Corax by his rhetorical art was able to sway the new assembly and direct the democratic state. This art he formulated in rules, and undertook to teach for a fee; and among his pupils was Tisias. Tisias, having learnt the art, refused to pay the fee; and so the famous lawsuit came on. The story is given in substantially the same form by a number of authors, most of whom say that Corax had been powerful at the court of Hiero, and devised his art as a means of maintaining that power in a republic.[3] All these, therefore, make rhetoric begin with political oratory, or what would later be called the γένος συμβουλευτικόν: and they go on to draw the line of descent from Tisias to Gorgias, who carried the art to Athens on his embassy of 427. The other tradition is that of Aristotle as quoted by Cicero (*Brutus* 46). This also places the activity of Tisias and Corax presumably in the republic established at Syracuse after the death of Hiero and the expulsion of Thrasybulus in 466; but it makes them theorists not in the political but in the forensic field, *cum sublatis in Sicilia tyrannis res priuatae longo interuallo iudiciis repeterentur.* This account is to be preferred; for it is notorious that the earliest systems of rhetoric were occupied entirely with the business of judicial oratory. This is stated in the *Phaedrus* (261 B), and is equally a matter of complaint for both Isocrates (*adv. soph.* 19) and Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1354[b]), who in well-known passages express themselves very positively. The shortcoming of which they complain is one of theory. We need not necessarily disbelieve the minor rhetoricians if they tell us that Corax was active

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[1] *Prol. Syll.* 189 = vii. 5 (W.); cf. Syrian, iv. 575 (Walz) = ii. 127 (Rabe).

[2] See P. Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition in der alten τέχνη ῥητορική* (*Rhetorische Studien* 2), Paderborn, 1914, pp. 9 ff.; and Stegeman

in *R.E.* v a, 142.

[3] Fullest account in iv. 11– W.=269– R. and Doxapater vi. 12– =25 R. Cf. Troilus vi. 48=52 R.; Max. Plan. v. 215=67 R.; *Prol.* vii. 5=189 R.

politically. But it is as a theorist, not as a practitioner, that he is important to us; and in determining the scope of his theory we cannot refuse the combined evidence of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Whatever allowance is made for their polemical attitude and for their eagerness to point out a failing to which they consider themselves superior, we must conclude that that failing was real, and that the system of Tisias and Corax was indeed adapted only to the oratory of the courts. No one who is familiar with the later tendencies of ancient rhetorical theory will find this surprising.

The principal part of that system is the celebrated doctrine of εἰκός or argument from probabilities. The stock example of this type of argument is well known: a puny man, accused of assaulting a big man, defends himself on the ground not of evidence but of the improbability of his having made such an assault. We have to consider what principle underlies such arguments, and what Corax may be said to have invented or discovered. Most of the arguments that an orator uses are in a sense only probable. It is seldom that he can demonstrate by rigorous logic from necessary premisses. But we must distinguish between arguments in which the form of reasoning is strict, and only the doubtful truth of the premisses makes the conclusion uncertain; and arguments in which the form of reasoning itself is no more than probable, even if the premisses are true. It is the importance to the orator of arguments of the latter class that Corax recognized, though the Aristotelian terms by which it is convenient for us to distinguish them were of course far from his mind. Thus set out, the matter seems so obvious that no one could well have discovered it, and so general that there could be no profit in the discovery. But we are to consider the characters of the two types of argument. The first type argues normally from particular evidence, on the truth of which it entirely depends. This is the simplest and directest, one might almost say the most natural type. Corax's probable reasonings, on the other hand, proceed altogether from a computation of general experience. What will happen or has happened in a particular case is inferred from what usually happens. This standard, though not absolutely to be relied on in any particular case, must nevertheless be in general correct: and so in general arguments from it command assent. Corax's notion seems to have been that such probable arguments, logically inconclusive though they must be, are nevertheless often more effective than stricter arguments from particular evidence, because they are based on general observations which every one will admit to be true: while the stricter reasoning which we might expect to carry more weight carries less, because its force depends entirely on the truth of particular premisses which the hearer may be not at all disposed to believe; and far more people are impressed by admitted truth in the premisses than by logical cogency in the reasoning.   The orator who can adduce general probability but no particular evidence on his side appeals to a real sentiment in his audience when he urges them, however fallaciously, to prefer probability to testimony because it is incorruptible, saying ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν (Arist. *Rhet.* 1376ᵃ). These probable arguments, by their reference to universal and undoubted experience, do seem to have an authority and validity not belonging to those drawn merely from the alleged circumstances of a particular case.

But probability, even while possessing the authority of a working approximation to truth, has in the eyes of the sophistic rhetorician a still greater advantage, that one can argue from it independently of truth. Though one probability makes for a case, yet another can almost certainly be found that makes against it. The nature of this manipulation is well explained by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1402ᵃ). 'In eristics', he says, 'an apparent syllogism may be made by confounding the absolute and the conditional, as in the dialectical arguments that the non-existent is, because the non-existent is

non-existent; and that the unknowable may be known, because it may be known to be unknowable. Similarly in rhetoric an apparent enthymeme may be made from a probability not absolute but conditional. This probability is not generally valid; as Agathon illustrates in the lines

> Well might one say just this is probable,
> that much not probable should come to pass.

Things happen against probability; so that things against probability are probable. At that rate the improbable will be probable; only the probability is not absolute. As in eristics the deception lies in not adding the conditions, application, or manner in which our statement is valid, so in rhetoric it lies in the probability's being not absolute but conditional. On this topic Corax's system is constructed. If a man is not open to the charge, as when a puny man is accused of assault, then it is not probable that he is guilty. If he is open to it, as a strong man would be, then again it is not probable that he is guilty, just because it would have been sure to seem probable. The same applies in all his cases. The accused must either be open to the charge or not, and in each case a probability appears; but one is absolute, the other of the particular kind described.'

Aristotle's account excellently describes the sophistic method of argument from probability. Two things are noticeable: first, that the whole of Corax's method is spoken of as being directed to judicial cases, and in these does not go outside criminal charges; secondly, that even in these it is employed only to argue the facts of the case, or perhaps the results of one or another verdict, never its merits. So much we must infer from Aristotle's statement that the whole of Corax's method of argument is of this type, and that in all his cases the defendant is bound 'either to be open to the charge or not'.

Honestly used, argument from probability is an approximation to truth necessary for the practice of oratory as elsewhere: but when it is irresponsibly exploited in this way it no longer serves truth but seeks to supplant it. It was as a supplanter that Plato saw it and condemned it in the *Phaedrus*. His argument, indeed, is directed against something much wider than this particular sophism of Corax, against the whole notion of an art that claims to decide cases without knowledge of the truth. The first condition that Socrates lays down for good writing or oratory is that the author should 'know in his mind the truth about whatever he is to discuss' (259 E). Those, he says, who believe that an orator needs to know only what passes with his audience for truth will leave both orator and audience floundering in ridiculous error. Even if our purpose is to mislead, we cannot be sure of attaining it unless we ourselves command the truths both of ethics and of psychology; and past these there is no short cut such as the sophists imagine. As characteristic of these imagined short cuts Plato takes the doctrine of probability, upon which he then makes a special attack: but that attack, besides being concerned to put Corax's method in the worst possible light, also makes it stand for a type of the whole of sophistic rhetoric; and we shall not rightly understand it unless we see that Plato is combating something more than the particular method of argument that Aristotle exposes. The sophists, he says, maintain that there is no need to know the truths of ethics or of psychology to be an adequate rhetorician. In the law courts no one pays any attention to these things, but only to what is plausible, that is, to probability. The man who intends to possess the art of speaking will apply himself to this. Sometimes he must not even tell the very facts of the case, if they are improbable, and must substitute probable ones, either in attack or in defence. It is probability at all costs that he is required to pursue in speaking, and truth must go by the board. This principle consistently observed makes him master of the whole art. The illustration that Socrates then cites from

Tisias is similar to Aristotle's, but embroidered: for as the simplest example best suited Aristotle's purpose, so the most extravagant best suits Plato's. A puny but fierce man is on trial, having robbed with violence a burly man who is actually a coward. Here neither side admits the truth. The big man, considering the improbability of the true charge, pretends that the little man was one of several who attacked him. The other, denying this, uses the direct argument from probability: 'how could a little man like myself have attacked a big man like him?' The big man will not confess his own cowardice, and tries to put up other false stories; and so the defendant, as likely as not, catches him out. And in all cases, says Socrates, the rules of the art are much the same. This example is of course concocted by Plato to be as fantastic as possible; and, as Thompson observes in his note, 'the impotent conclusion is maliciously added by Socrates'. The attack is one of ridicule, not of analysis: and the case as here given does not even illustrate the sophistic exploitation of absolute and conditional probability on which Corax largely relies, and which Aristotle exposes. The only argument from probability involved is of the simplest form: but that is pushed to extreme lengths, when the accuser falsifies his whole case in the interests of plausibility. The defendant meets the accuser's probability with evidence, and builds his own probability on his own version of the facts. The Platonic version, therefore, though apparently more circumstantial than Aristotle's, is less useful in indicating the characteristics of Corax's argument. Nevertheless it confirms our previous observation that Corax's arguments are concerned only with the facts of the case, and only with criminal cases. Socrates leads off as though some short cut past ethics and psychology were to be propounded that would serve the whole of rhetoric. The more marked, therefore, are the successive limitations which restrict the doctrine of probability, as it is set out in 272 D–E, first to the courts and then to accusation and defence.[1] At the same time Plato does point to a feature of argument from probability that Aristotle passes over: namely, its dependence on an empirical psychology. Aristotle wishes to display only the formal vices of the argument. Plato, to whom the notion of a formal art, indifferent to external truth, is repugnant, insists on the inadequacy of its premises; and notices that Tisias' probable arguments are often based on rough and ready psychological grounds: they turn upon the motives and restraints which may be supposed to have governed the mind of the accused. Plato complains that the psychology, or rather the substitute for it, used by Tisias is crude and unscientific: but he expects too much in requiring rhetoric to be founded on exact psychology. In general it can be based only on that common and approximate knowledge of the workings of the mind which men possess in themselves and can appeal to in others.

The art of Tisias and Corax, so Plato and Aristotle agree, may be reduced to this type of argument; but neither they nor any one else tell us how Tisias and Corax actually presented it. We are left to guess not only what was their method of instruction, but also how well their own ideas were defined, and whether they had any clear abstract notion of probable argument, or in what sense they could be said to have reduced it to a system. Like all practical teachers they must have taught largely by examples: the like of which, one may suppose, is preserved in the first tetralogy of Antipho, a piece obviously written to demonstrate the use of the kind of argument that we have been discussing. The question is, did those examples serve to teach a method or only to produce an empirical faculty? An answer is suggested by Aristotle in the *Sophistici Elenchi* at 183[b] 17 ff. 'The beginnings of all inventions', he says, 'are small in bulk, though in importance they outweigh everything that follows. So in rhetoric the first inventors'—by which presumably he means simply Corax, with

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[1] Thomson at 272 E interprets καὶ πάντως to mean 'not only in the practice of the courts but also in that of the assembly'. I take it rather to mean 'at whatever cost'.

a vague allusion to any rival claimants—'the first inventors did not carry the art far; and it attained its present bulk by the subsequent labours first of Tisias, then of Thrasymachus, then of Theodorus and many others. In dialectics, on the other hand, nothing at all had been done before the present work. The professional eristics taught by the same method as Gorgias, giving their pupils set disputations as he gave them set declamations, to learn by heart, of a pattern that they conceived would meet most cases': a quick but unscientific method, as Aristotle explains. From this passage we may infer three things: first, that Aristotle believed Corax to have laid for rhetoric some foundation not wholly incomparable with that which it had been reserved for himself to lay for dialectics; secondly, that Tisias, coming after, made developments which Aristotle was able to distinguish from Corax's foundation; and thirdly, that the tradition of Corax and Tisias was continued by Thrasymachus and Theodorus, whereas Gorgias stood outside it; for on the one hand his name is omitted from among the successors of Corax, on the other the unscientific methods of the early eristic dialecticians, who had made no progress at all in the theory of their subject, are likened to his methods of teaching rhetoric. It is evidently implied, therefore, that Corax's rhetoric, unlike Gorgias', was something more than a collection of specimens, and that he had discovered some formal principle of the art; but that his discovery was only the germ of the developed system.

It would be surprising if Corax had gone far in the dialectical analysis of his arguments, in which the dialecticians themselves had made no progress; or if the methods of such a pioneer had been anything but largely empirical. But Aristotle does not say that he conceived more than the germ of systematic rhetoric, and we may think of the matter thus. Aristotle distinguished two kinds of proof used by rhetoricians, the ἔντεχνος and the ἄτεχνος, which we may call technical and natural. Natural proofs are all direct evidence, from testimony, documents, or whatever source. Technical proofs are those that depend on arguments devised by the orator. The natural proofs are of course unrhetorical, or if you will pre-rhetorical,[1] and do not depend on the art. Corax's argument from probability, on the other hand, is an extreme form of technical proof, being entirely the product of rhetorical art and more or less independent of external evidence. As the first exponent of this characteristically technical weapon, which stands in sharp opposition to the natural arguments of the uninstructed, Corax may fairly take place in Aristotle's view at the head of the systematic rhetoricians: for he had conceived a notion which could be systematically developed. It is possible, perhaps likely, that Corax did no more.

But Tisias at least, it is implied, began to reduce probable argument to a system, and while Gorgias merely held out finished specimens for imitation, he imparted some method to his presentation, some classification perhaps of topics. The method of rhetorical argument as it was later formulated comprised two parts, the formal and the material: or, as we may say, logic and topics. The development of logic was reserved for Aristotle: but it may be that Tisias made a beginning in the classification of topics.[2] If this is so, he was even more the founder of rhetoric than we usually reckon; for the classification of topics is the principal part of all the later systems of rhetorical invention.

There is another element of rhetorical theory which is by some attributed to Tisias and Corax: namely, a canon of the parts of the judicial speech. This canon comprises typically four parts, proem, narrative, demonstration, and epilogue; but admits of many variations. It seems to have supplied the plan of arrangement of standard rhetorical treatises before the time of Aristotle.[3] It would therefore be

[1] Cf. F. Solmsen, *Antiphonstudien (Neue philologische Untersuchungen*, viii), Berlin, 1931, pp. 5 ff.

[2] Cf. W. Süss, *Ethos*, pp. 2 ff.

[3] K. Barwick, *Hermes*, lvii (1922), 1–.

natural for us to accept the evidence of those authorities who attribute it to the first founders of the art. But a simple argument from conditional probability shows that such reasoning is insecure, because the same conjecture would have been a natural one for our authorities themselves; and their evidence is in fact so vague and contradictory that we must suspect it of being worthless. It is contained in a number of passages of the minor Greek rhetoricians, all more or less connected. Corax, according to them, devised his canon of parts of the speech when he first developed deliberative rhetoric in the Syracusan assembly (cf. p. 62, *supra*). But the canon of parts attributed to him is nearly always judicial, not deliberative. This in itself is suspicious. It is still more suspicious that, though all our authors tell much the same story, they vary widely in the actual list of parts.

The principal passages are the following:

A (*Prol. Syll.* 25 = W. vii. 11), the work of an anonymous Christian author whose garrulous and fabulizing *Prolegomena Artis Rhetoricae*, first compiled perhaps in the fourth or fifth century, were in constant use by writers of the Byzantine age. After the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero, he says (a tyranny marked by every kind of savagery, under which the citizens were forbidden to speak, and so being obliged to communicate by pantomime invented the art of dancing), the Syracusans established a democracy. Κόραξ δέ τις ὄνομα, Συρακούσσιος τὸ γένος, σκοπήσας ὡς ὁ δῆμος ἀστάθμητον καὶ ἄτακτον πέφυκε πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἐννοήσας ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ᾧ ῥυθμίζεται ἀνθρώπου τρόπος, ἐσκόπησε διὰ λόγου ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσφορα τὸν δῆμον καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν. εἰσελθὼν οὖν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ ὁ πᾶς συνηθροίσθη δῆμος, ἤρξατο λόγοις πρότερον θεραπευτικοῖς καὶ κολακευτικοῖς τὴν ὄχλησιν καὶ τὸ θορυβῶδες καταπραῦναι τοῦ δήμου, ἅτινα καὶ προοίμια ἐκάλεσε. μετὰ δὲ τὸ καταπραῦναι καὶ κατασιγάσαι τὸν δῆμον ἤρξατο περὶ ὧν ἔδει συμβουλεύειν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ λέγειν ὡς ἐν διηγήσει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκειν ἐν συντόμῳ περὶ τῶν φθασάντων καὶ εἰς σύνοπτον καὶ ὑπ᾽ ὄψιν ἄγειν τὰ λεχθέντα τῷ δήμῳ. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐκάλεσε προοίμια, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ἐκάλεσεν ἀγῶνας, τὰ δὲ τρίτα ἐκάλεσεν ἐπιλόγους. This account is followed in the *Epitome Rhetorices* at iii. 160 W.

B (*Prol. Syll.* 52 = W. vi. 48), from the more philosophical *Prolegomena* of Troilus Sophista, a Christian author of the fifth century: Ἱέρων καὶ Γέλων Σικελίας γεγόνασι τύραννοι, ἔσχον δέ τινα Κόρακα τῷ ὀνόματι παραδυναστεύοντα, ὃς ἐποίει τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν πολλῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς. μεταπεσούσης δὲ τῆς τυραννίδος εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ἑώρα γὰρ ὡς οὐ δύναται πείθειν ἅπαντα τὸν δῆμον καθάπερ ἕνα τῶν τυράννων, ἐμηχανᾶτο τὰ προοίμια, ἵνα δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐφελκύσηται τὸν ἀκροατὴν πρὸς εὔνοιαν, εἶτα τὴν προκατασκευήν, ἵνα ἀνέλῃ αἰτίαν λυποῦσαν αὐτόν, εἶτα τὴν προκατάστασιν, εἰσβολὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ προοίμιον οὖσαν ἐπὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, τὴν δὲ κατάστασιν ψιλὴν τῶν πραχθέντων ἔκθεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγῶνας ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πίστιν τῶν ψιλῶς διηγηθέντων, εἶτα τὴν παρέκβασιν ἀπόδειξιν οὖσαν τοῦ κρινομένου βίου· ἐσκόπει γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ ἑνὶ καὶ μόνῳ ἐγκλήματι τὸ †ὁ φεύγων ἀπολυθήσεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν παρέκβασιν ἐπενόησε, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιλόγους ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν τῶν εἰρημένων διὰ τὸ ὡς εἰκὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς πολλὰ ἀκούσαντας εἰς λήθην ἐλθεῖν.

C (*Prol. Syll.* 126 = W. ii. 119), a brief version of A included by John Doxapater in his commentary on Aphthonius, written in the eleventh century.

D (*Prol. Syll.* 189 = W. vii. 6), from the anonymous prolegomena to Hermogenes, giving a very summary version of B which is also found in the *Prolegomena* of Planudes (*Prol. Syll.* 67 = W. v. 215).

E (*Prol. Syll.* 269 = W. iv. 11), from the prolegomena to Hermogenes attributed conjecturally to Marcellinus, combining the versions of A and B.

Of these passages A and B, though their general similarity must be due ultimately to a common source, have no immediate connexion with each other. The rest appear to be dependent on them. The story given by A requires, it would seem, not the three *partes orationis* mentioned, but four, προοίμιον, διήγησις, ἀγών, and ἐπίλογος: and these, in fact, we find both in C and also in D, which in other respects follows B. E, which

in its story combines A and B, gives five, which fit no better than three. B's seven
are avowedly judicial, not deliberative, and must therefore be drawn ultimately
from some source different from that of the rest of the story.

It is evident that the personal authority of these writers is worth almost nothing;
though if we must choose between them on such grounds, probably Troilus is to be
preferred. The four canonical Isocratean *partes orationis* we suspect just because we
should expect to find them referred back to the inventor of the art. Troilus' seven,
on the other hand, are to a certain degree recommended by their singularity. Further,
Syrian (ii. 127 Rabe = W. iv. 575) attributes the term κατάστασις to Corax, though in
a different sense; and Antipho, who so well illustrates the method of argument from
probability, also makes constant use of προκατασκευή.

These arguments, which incline us to accept, if anything, the evidence of Troilus,
are suggested by Hamberger (op. cit., pp. 26 ff.); but he also attempts, at Drerup's
suggestion, to obtain for Troilus' account the authority of Aristotle. Sopater, he
argues, at the beginning of his commentary on Hermogenes offers an introduction on
the same lines as Troilus' (W. v. 3 ff.). He also has some words about Corax's being
the first founder of a system of rhetoric which, from their similarity to Cicero, *Brutus*
46, can be traced to Aristotle's *Synagoga*.[1] Hamberger therefore presumes upon the
general similarity between Troilus and Sopater to declare a common sub-Aristotelian
source, which he reconstructs by inserting into the text of Sopater the section of
Troilus for which he wishes to obtain the credit of Aristotle's name. The charitable
critic hesitates whether to call this ineptitude or impudence. Even if Troilus and
Sopater were closely copying a common source it would not follow that Troilus' seven
partes orationis, patently inconsistent with the rest of his story, were drawn from it.
Our passage D, for instance, also combines Sopater's with one stage of Troilus'
version; and it attributes to Corax the four Isocratean parts. But besides this it is
perfectly plain that the sources of Troilus and Sopater, though related, are not the
same. Their independence is particularly striking because, while they follow the same
general plan, what they write is widely different.

Some further grounds for inference upon this question may be found in what we
know about Thrasymachus and Theodorus, whom Aristotle in the passage quoted
above puts third and fourth respectively of the pioneers of rhetorical theory. Thrasy-
machus is celebrated as a conjurer with ἔλεος and ὀργή. Τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ
γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων, says Plato in the same section of the *Phaedrus*
(267 C), κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς
ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ
ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος: activities which later at least were particularly
associated with the proem and peroration. Theodorus is actually characterized by
Plato as the ingenious inventor of technical terms for the parts of the speech, προοί-
μιον μὲν πρῶτον . . . δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ, τρίτον δὲ τεκμήρια,
τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον
Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα . . . καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ
ἀπολογίᾳ. Something similar, from a source which I cannot identify, is preserved in
Martianus Capella v, § 552. Τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων, Plato adds finally, κοινῇ πᾶσιν
ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα.

This form of classification, then, seemed to Plato characteristic at least of Tisias'
and Corax's immediate successors: and here again Antipho exemplifies the theory.
A single dark utterance of Aristotle's completes the evidence. In the second book of
his *Rhetoric* Aristotle runs through a cryptic and tumultuary catalogue of twenty-
eight topics of argument. The twenty-seventh of these (1400[b]) is τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτη-
θέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, with an instance from Carcinus' *Medea*. Medea's

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[1] Cf. Gercke, *Hermes*, xxxii. 344.

children are nowhere to be found. Some say she has made away with them. She retorts that Jason, not they, would have been her proper victim. To murder them without him would have been a blunder.[1] ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη. This startling statement appears a little less odd when we reflect that the topic is only a special form of εἰκός; and that the standard example of the big man who argues that he would have been a fool to hit the little man first is a precisely similar reasoning ἐξ ἁμαρτηθέντων. But what is the meaning of ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη? Does it mean Theodorus' early theory, as opposed to his later system of προοίμιον, διήγησις, and the rest? Or does it mean rhetorical theory before Theodorus, that is Tisias and Corax (though not presumably, this time, Thrasymachus); with the implication that Theodorus was himself the originator of the canon of parts of the speech, a thing unknown in pre-theodorean rhetoric? Kroll and Solmsen hold divergent views (*R.E. Suppl.* Rhetorik, 3 and V a, 1842 f.). If it could be certainly interpreted the passage might provide crucial evidence for this outstanding question. As it is, the matter remains open.

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[1] The sense of this passage is in all our texts obscured by the words ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων, which appear to be an interpolation.